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Abstract 
 
On October 1st, 2015, the tenth revision of the International Classification of Diseases 
(ICD-10) will be mandatorily implemented in the United States.  Although this medical 
classification system will allow healthcare professionals to code with greater accuracy, 
specificity, and detail, these codes will have a significant impact on the flavor of healthcare 
insurance claims.  While the overall benefit of ICD-10 throughout the healthcare industry is 
unquestionable, some experts believe healthcare fraud detection and prevention could experience 
an initial drop in performance due to the implementation of ICD-10.  We aim to quantitatively 
test the validity of this concern regarding an adverse transitional impact.  This project explores 
how predictive fraud detection systems developed using ICD-9 claims data will initially react to 
the introduction of ICD-10.  We have developed a basic fraud detection system incorporating 
both unsupervised and supervised learning methods in order to examine the potential fraudulence 
of both ICD-9 and ICD-10 claims in a predictive environment.  Using this system, we are able to 
analyze the ability and performance of statistical methods trained using ICD-9 data to properly 
identify fraudulent ICD-10 claims.  This research makes contributions to the domains of medical 
coding, healthcare informatics, and fraud detection. 
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1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Motivation 
 
The process of medical classification and coding has been used for centuries to efficiently 
gather statistical data in an effort to measure the frequent causations of morality.  The 
International List of Causes of Death, the first edition of international medical classification, was 
formally adopted in 1893.  This classification system eventually evolved into the International 
Classification of Diseases (ICD), which has been maintained by the World Health Organization 
(WHO) since 1948.  The ICD code set allows both mortality and morbidity conditions to be 
described and tracked, and ten revisions to this system have been published to date1. 
 
Today, when an individual is seen or treated by a healthcare professional, a series of 
alphanumeric codes are still used to describe the medical diagnoses and services provided.  This 
designated classification structure, the ninth iteration of ICD, implements the use of coding for 
healthcare management, public health and medical informatics, and insurance purposes.  ICD-9 
has been the coding standard in the healthcare industry since October 1st, 1984.  The primary 
purpose of ICD-9 is to translate written information from a patient’s clinical statement regarding 
diagnoses and inpatient procedures into a series of universally understandable designations. 
 
The ICD-9 code set contains approximately 13,000 distinct codes.  Each ICD-9 code 
consists of a minimum of three digits and a maximum of five digits, with a decimal point after 
the third digit if more than three digits are used.  Figure 1 illustrates the standard format of an 
ICD-9 code.  The first three digits represent a single disease entity, or a group of similar or 
closely related conditions.  The fourth digit identifies a subcategory, providing additional 
information regarding the etiology, site, or disease manifestation.  Lastly, the fifth digit offers 
sub-classification of the subcategory, describing for example the mode of diagnosis or the 
anatomical site.  ICD-9 is primarily numeric, with the exception of supplementary V-codes and 
E-codes.  V-codes, characterized by a “V” as the first digit, are used when a patient seeks health 
care for reasons other than illness or injury.  E-codes describe external causation of injury, 
poisoning, and adverse reactions, and where, why, and how an injury occurred.  The structure of 
injuries described by ICD-9 codes are designated by the wound type, and the code omits 
laterality (left or right).  An example of an ICD-9 code is 812.21, which describes a closed 
fracture of the shaft of the humerus.  The first three digits, 812, describe a fracture of the 
humerus.  The fourth and fifth digits offer greater detail, describing a closed fracture on the shaft. 
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2	  
	  
 On October 1st, 2015, the new ICD-10 diagnosis and procedure coding system will take 
effect in the United States.  This implementation, which was originally scheduled to occur in 
October of 2011, has been delayed multiple times in an effort to allow the industry to become 
fully prepared.  ICD-10 differs significantly from ICD-9 in terms of structure and organization.  
The composition of the updated clinical coding system promotes a higher level of detail and 
specificity, which will better capture and describe necessary medical data [36].  The additional 
information provided by ICD-10 should ideally allow all parties involved, i.e. patients, providers, 
clearinghouses, and insurance companies, to operate in a more effective and efficient manner.   
 
The ICD-10 code set contains approximately 68,000 distinct codes, more than five times 
the number of possible ICD-9 codes.  Each ICD-10 code consists of a minimum of three digits 
and a maximum of seven digits, with a decimal point after the third digit if more than three digits 
are used.  Figure 2 illustrates the standard format of an ICD-10 code.  The first three digits 
represent the category, the fourth, fifth, and sixth digits represent the location, and the seventh 
digit identifies an extension.  Similar to ICD-9, the three digits to the immediate right of the 
decimal describe the etiology, anatomic site, and the severity.  The seventh extension digit 
describes the visit encounter or sequel for injures and external causes.  The first digit is always 
alphabetic, with the exception of the letter “U,” the second digit is always numeric, and the 
remaining five digits are alphanumeric.  The character “X” is used as a placeholder character, 
allowing for the future expansion of particular codes.  V-codes and E-codes have been 
eliminated from the ICD-10 code set, and are now incorporated in the main code set.  The 
structure of injuries described by ICD-10 codes are designated by the location/body part, and 
laterality is included.  The ICD-10 equivalent of the ICD-9 code 812.21 described earlier is 
S42.321A.  “S42” identifies the injury as a displaced transverse fracture.  The number “3” 
specifies the fracture as a humerus fracture, the number “2” indicates the fracture is located on 
the shaft of the humerus, and the number “1” indicates the injury was sustained on the patient’s 
right arm.  An “A” extension signals that this is an initial encounter for the closed fracture for 
this particular patient.  
 
 
 
   
 (2) 
   
 
 
Thirty years ago, when ICD-9 was first introduced, data needs were dramatically 
diminished.  The applications for coded medical data today go well beyond the purposes for 
which ICD-9-CM was originally designed.  The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 
(CMS) have outlined the nine primary advantages ICD-10 will provide2.  ICD-10 is superior to 
ICD-9 with respect to: 
 
1. Measuring the quality, safety, and efficacy of care 
2. Designing payment systems and processing claims for reimbursement 
3. Conducting research, epidemiological studies, and clinical trials 
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  http://questions.cms.hhs.gov/app/answers/detail/a_id/10027/kw/icd-­‐10	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4. Setting health policy 
5. Operational and strategic planning and designing healthcare delivery systems 
6. Monitoring resource utilization 
7. Improving clinical, financial, and administrative performance 
8. Preventing and detecting healthcare fraud and abuse 
9. Tracking public concerns and assessing risks of adverse public health events 
 
The eighth item in the list above, the prevention and detection of healthcare fraud and 
abuse, is an aspect of ICD-10 that is studied throughout the course of this research project.  The 
topic of healthcare fraud and abuse is discussed in further detail in the following subsection. 
 
1.2 Background 
 
Due to the nature of these coding languages, both ICD-9 and ICD-10 lend themselves to 
exploitation by physicians and/or providers.  Social insurance programs such as Medicare and 
Medicaid, and private insurance companies allocate payment according to the clinical codes 
provided in healthcare claims.  When codes are intentionally misrepresented, inappropriate 
monetary returns can potentially be distributed.  Situations involving financially motivated 
deception are considered to be instances of healthcare fraud and abuse.   
 
Fraud and abuse within the healthcare arena have occurred in numerous schematic forms, 
but there are nine primary strategies that have been identified as both prevalent and advantageous 
in the medical field [37].  These popular schemes are listed below. 
 
1. Billing for services not rendered 
2. Upcoding of services 
3. Upcoding of items 
4. Duplicate claims 
5. Unbundling 
6. Excessive services 
7. Unnecessary services 
8. Kickbacks and bribery 
 
During this research project, we focused on the detection of billing for services not 
rendered, unbundling, and billing for excessive or unnecessary services.  These particular 
schemes, numbers 1, 5, and 6, were chosen due to their potential affiliation with the medical 
claims data we had access to.  The process of determining which types of fraud to concentrate 
on, referred to as goal setting, is a topic reviewed in Section 2.1.2.  
 
In order to avoid the improper payment of fraudulent healthcare claims, the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and private companies such as Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield, United Healthcare, and Humana use aggregations of analytical algorithms for detection 
and prevention.  These machine learning algorithms can generally be divided into two main 
categories: supervised learning and unsupervised learning.  Both groups are discussed in further 
detail in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.  Supervised statistical methods are commonly used to analyze 
current and historical data and patterns in an effort to accurately predict future, unknown events 
4	  
	  
and outcomes.  The dynamic nature of these techniques allows a continuous increase in 
performance and accuracy to occur.  When ICD-10 is introduced in October of 2015, these 
systems, constructed using past ICD-9 data and trends, will essentially be reset, and the accuracy 
of fraud detection could potentially deteriorate until a proper amount of ICD-10 data is 
accumulated [29].  The unknown impact of implementation is a serious threat to the predictive 
modeling necessary to properly identify fraudulent behavior [4, 18].  ICD-10 will undoubtedly 
benefit the entire industry once the transitional period has past, but healthcare insurance 
providers will encounter challenges during the infantile period regarding the accurate detection 
of fraud [8].  
 
1.3 Research Goals 
 
To the best of our knowledge, the future impact of ICD-10 on predictive fraud detection 
has yet to be studied in any quantifiable manner.  Domain experts have suggested that the initial 
lack of ICD-10 training data could lead to the inaccurate recognition of abnormal medical 
claims, but no original, published analysis has examined this possibility.  ICD-9 diagnosis and 
procedure codes have played an important role in the majority of past healthcare fraud research 
projects.  Researchers have identified these codes as prevalent metrics that should be 
incorporated in the algorithms, models, and systems used to detect fraud [2].  However, the 
transition from ICD-9 to ICD-10 and the potential effect it will have these metrics has been 
generally overlooked.  The objective of this research is to bridge the gap between existing 
healthcare fraud detection research and the industry’s transition to ICD-10. 
 
We evaluated this transitional impact through the use of logistic regression analysis, 
coupled with an outlier detection model.  Due to the nature of healthcare claims data that is 
available to the public, data containing labels indicating fraud is extremely difficult to acquire.  
Claims identified as fraudulent by insurance companies and agencies are typically redacted from 
data that is eventually published, because they are both unlawful and illegitimate.  Through the 
application of outlier detection, we were able to label medical claims data in an unsupervised 
manner for the purpose of supervised learning.  The first phase of the experiment provides the 
labeled training data necessary to perform regression analysis.  The development of a logistic 
regression model, the second phase, allowed us to study the influence of ICD-10 in a predictive 
environment. 
 
This project explores the validity of predictions from domain professionals regarding fraud 
detection and the implementation of the ICD-10 code set.  The notion that fraud detection 
systems using supervised learning algorithms will encounter an initial decline in performance 
due to ICD-10 is fairly unsupported at the moment.  We claim that the results from our 
experiment will provide evidence that will support this notion of an initial negative transitional 
impact. 
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1.4 Approach 
 
 A year’s worth of medical claims were first grouped into a smaller number of clinically 
meaningful categories according to their diagnosis and procedure codes.  An outlier detection 
algorithm was then used to identify anomalies present in each of the groups based on the amount 
billed to a given payer, and those abnormal claims were flagged as fraudulent.  The sole purpose 
of this process was to create the labeled training data necessary to construct a supervised learning 
model. 
 
 After the process of generating training data was complete, a logistic regression model 
served as a predictive tool that mimicked the predictive capabilities of existing fraud detection 
and prevention systems being used within the industry.  A second year’s worth of claims data 
was analyzed, and probable instances of fraud were flagged.  ICD-9 codes, attributes of each 
claim, were translated into ICD-10 using crosswalks, and the modified dataset was re-analyzed.  
We found that eliminating two covariates caused the logistic regression models to flag a 
significant number of both false-positive and false-negative healthcare claims as fraudulent. 
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2 Related Work 
 
2.1 Healthcare Data 
 
The implementation of the electronic health record (EHR) has allowed healthcare 
organizations to collect and externally report/provide a greater amount of data to the public 
sector.  The EHR is a systematic collection of electronic health information about an individual 
patient or population, and can include a range of data, including demographics, medical history, 
medication and allergies, immunization status, laboratory test results, radiology images, vital 
signs, personal statistics, and billing information.  Fraud detection research in the field of 
healthcare management has primarily concentrated on medical billing data, which is derived 
from the EHR.  After a patient’s medical record is updated by a physician or staff member, 
diagnosis and procedure codes are assigned by a medical coder.  The appropriate medical codes 
and necessary data from the EHR are incorporated into an ANSI 837 file, which is submitted to 
the payer directly or via a clearinghouse.  An insurance company is usually the recipient of this 
claim file, so the majority of suitable fraud detection data comes from health insurance agencies. 
 
2.1.1 Sources 
 
 Healthcare fraud literature originating from countries outside of the United States have 
used a variety of sources to acquire medical claims data.  The National Health Insurance 
Administration (NHIA) in Taiwan has provided data to multiple research groups [6, 16, 22, 38, 
42], and the NHIA equivalent in South Korea, the National Health Insurance (NHI) system, has 
also contributed to studies [34].  Two major Australian governmental health departments, the 
Health Insurance Commission (HIC) and Medicare Australia, have been reported as the sources 
of data in numerous pertinent research projects [14, 15, 31, 32, 36, 39].  Healthcare claims data 
from private insurance companies located in Turkey and Chile has also been used by several 
researchers [17, 19, 28]. 
 
 Within the United States, various agencies within the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) have been involved with research exploring the detection and prevention of 
healthcare fraud.  The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and its predecessor, 
the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA), both supplied members of academia with 
Medicare and Medicaid data [11, 23, 25, 33].  Researchers in the United States have also worked 
with private insurance companies and hospitals, using data collected by these organizations [24, 
27]. 
 
2.1.2 Preprocessing 
 
The raw healthcare insurance data provided by any governmental health department or 
private agency is rarely organized in such a way that the researcher is satisfied with the structure.  
In order to appropriately arrange and organize the data, preprocessing must occur.  The raw data 
must be processed into a form that is suitable for the statistical methods being used.  Although 
this task is both extremely time-consuming and challenging, the process is infrequently 
documented, explicitly described in only two pieces of literature [21, 35].  Using aggregated 
information from these two papers and various other unrelated external sources, Li, Huang, Jin, 
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and Shi constructed the following flowchart, Figure 3, which outlines the steps commonly 
involved with preprocessing [20]. 
 
(3) 
 
 The purpose of goal setting is to determine which forms of healthcare fraud, identified in 
Section 1.2, are of interest and/or concern.  Detection can then be tailored to focus on these 
particular schemes.  Typically, domain experts assist in this process of prioritization, having both 
the knowledge and the resources to gauge the frequency and financial loss associated with 
different types of fraud.  The medical claims data used during the experimentation phase must 
then correspond to the forms of fraud selected.  This step is rarely discussed in relevant literature, 
but has likely occurred in some capacity during every documented research project involving 
healthcare fraud detection. Sokol, Garcia, West, Rodriguez and Johnson met with representatives 
from the HCFA and the Office of the Inspector General, and ultimately decided to focus on six 
fraudulent schemes that could be properly identified using available HCFA data [35].  
Capelleveen used the input provided by Medicaid fraud experts to zero-in on the most prevalent 
schemes found in Medicaid dental claims [5]. 
 
  Flaws within healthcare claims data and irrelevant views of the data can cause significant 
issues during the training of a statistical model, the grouping of abnormal claims, or the 
identification of suspicious instances.  Resolving inconsistent representations of the same 
concept, appropriately handling missing values, and transforming raw data into a flattened table 
format are all vital steps of the preprocessing phase.  The data used in our research had already 
undergone cleaning, imputation, and transformation by the vendor.  Therefore, these three stages 
of the preprocessing method will not be discussed. 
 
  In order to maximize the discrimination power of any given statistical method being 
employed in a fraud detection capacity, features, also known as metrics or predictors, must be 
selected from the original data attributes that will provide the information necessary to separate 
fraudulent and legitimate claims.  Feature selection can be done manually with the assistance of 
domain experts, or computationally using machine learning algorithms.  Most researchers 
working in the healthcare domain consult with experts to identify discriminating metrics.  Due to 
the sensitive nature of this classified information, this process is usually redacted in the literature 
by the authors.  Ortega, Figueroa, and Ruz published the procedure they used, but were unable to 
include the features that they ultimately selected [28].  This group worked with domain experts 
to first define a preliminary set of features, correlation checks were then performed to delete 
redundant features, and lastly, the discriminating power of each feature was tested.  Only those 
features with discriminating power above a certain predefined threshold were selected. 
 
 The auditing of data to assess both quality and utility is an important conclusion to the 
preprocessing method.  Researchers use statistical software such as SAS, SPSS, Stata, and R to 
execute basic statistical analysis and visualization in an effort to become familiar with the data.  
Every research group referenced so far performed some form of data auditing before conducting 
their respective experiments. 
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2.2 Statistical Modeling Involving Supervised Learning 
 
 Supervised learning is a category of machine learning algorithms that uses training data 
to make predictions.  Training data consists of both input data as well as corresponding response 
values.  Using this known information, supervised learning algorithms develop models that can 
predict response values for instances in an unknown set of data.  These algorithms benefit from 
larger sets of training data, which allows them to construct models with higher predictive power 
that can generalize more accurately.   
 
2.2.1 Support Vector Machines 
 
 Using a set of training data where each instance is identified as being fraudulent or non-
fraudulent, a Support Vector Machine (SVM) constructs a model that assigns new healthcare 
claims to one of the two categories.  The SVM creates a hyperplane, and each training data 
instance is represented as a point in space.  The functional margin, the distance to the nearest 
training instance in either category, should be as large as possible.  When the functional margin 
is maximized, a clear gap will exist between the two categories, which will minimize the 
generalization error of the SVM.  Each new claim is mapped onto the hyperplane, and its 
location in the functional margin determines if the claim is deemed fraudulent or non-fraudulent.  
Both research groups that have used SVMs relied on the standard linear classification ability of 
the SVM to detect abnormal healthcare claims.  Kirlidog and Asuk used longitudinal data that 
spanned a nine year period, marking records that had a probability of anomaly greater than 0.5 as 
anomalous [17].  Of the 808,348 records spanning from 2001 to 2009, 6,595 claims had 
probabilities ranging from 0.5 to 0.673.  These anomalous claims were analyzed according to 
three primary criteria: the status of the claim (rejected or accepted), the excessivity in terms of 
the bill amount of the claim compared to other claims from the same type of health center, and 
the excessivity of the claim compared to other claims from a particular health center.  The 
purpose of this analysis was to examine the rejected-anomalous relationship and the possibility 
of initiating investigations based off the relative excessivity of claims.  Kumar, Ghani, and Mei 
addressed concept drift, the scenario when the relation between the input data and the target 
variable changes over time, and the evolution of the target function by using seasonal subsets of 
their data, instead of longitudinal data [19].  A system was proposed that minimized payment 
errors made by insurance companies by predicting claims that needed to be reworked using 
SVMs.  They found that this system produced an order of magnitude better precision over 
existing detection approaches, and this in turn could potentially save insurance companies $15 to 
$25 million each year.     
 
2.2.2 Artificial Neural Networks 
 
 An Artificial Neural Network (ANN) is a graph consisting of nodes and edges that is 
organized into layers.  Each layer is made up of a number of interconnected nodes which contain 
an activation function.  Training data containing known instances of fraud is presented to the 
ANN via the input layer, which in turn communicates to one or more of the hidden layers.  The 
adaptive weights of the edges are tuned by a learning algorithm according to the input training 
data.  The hidden layers are connected to the output layer, which identifies new records as 
fraudulent or non-fraudulent.  ANN’s are generally used to approximate functions that are 
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unknown and depend on a large number of inputs.  In the case of fraud detection, the normality 
of each new claim is unknown, and the input is typically a large collection of medical claim 
features.  A two-layer neural network, the standard Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) consisting of 
an input layer, a hidden layer, and an output layer, is the most-commonly used ANN.  Oretga, 
Figueroa, and Ruz originally modeled each fraud problem using a standard MLP and small 
hidden layers, but the variance of each model was too high [28].  A committee of 10 multi-layer 
neural networks replaced the standard MLP, and the variance was appropriately reduced.  Their 
proposed system assigned a committee to each of the four entities primarily involved with 
healthcare fraud: providers, medical employers, affiliates, and medical claims.  The 
implementation of ANNs allowed all four types of fraudulent entities to be identified at a 
significantly quicker rate, thereby reducing the loss of insurance revenue.  During a comparison 
of the healthcare fraud detection performance of neural networks, logistic regression models, and 
classification trees, the two-layer neural network was tested against the two alternative 
supervised learning methods [22].  Using Clementine neural networks, variables were ranked 
according to their classification importance through sensitivity analysis, and these rankings were 
used in the construction of the ANN.  The neural network algorithm correctly identified 100% of 
the fraudulent hospitals, 91.47% of the normal hospitals, and had an overall correct identification 
rate of 95.73%.   
 
2.2.3 Classification Trees 
 
  Decision trees, which model decisions and their possible consequences, have been used 
as a predictive tool to map features of healthcare claims to conclusions regarding fraudulence 
and abnormality.  When the target variable, indicating fraud or non-fraud, can only assume a 
finite set of values, the decision tree is considered to be a classification tree.  Within the structure 
of a classification tree, external, leaf nodes represent the class labels of fraud and non-fraud, 
while branches represent conjunctions of features from a medical claim that lead to those two 
class labels.  Each internal, non-leaf node is labeled with an input feature from a claim instance, 
and the directed edges emanating from these nodes are labeled with each of the possible values 
the features can potentially assume.  Training data is used to construct an appropriate 
classification tree, and the fraudulent nature of unidentified healthcare claims is predicted using 
this logic model.  Classification trees have been used by researchers in a comparative capacity to 
identify fraudulent reporting of diabetic outpatient services, tested as an auditing strategy in the 
fiscal and insurance domains, and generated using the C4.5 and C5.0 classification algorithms to 
detect insurance subscribers’ fraud.  Liou, Tang, and Chen found that a classification tree 
correctly identified 100% of the fraudulent hospitals present in a set of data, 98.73% of the 
normal hospitals in the dataset, and had an overall correct identification rate of 99.3% [22].  A 
methodology for constructing profiles of fraudulent paying entities was proposed by Bonchi, 
Giannotti, Mainetto, and Pedreschi [3].  The following methodological issues were identified in 
this paper: defining of an audit cost model, monitoring the training-set construction, measuring 
the quality of a classifier, and tuning the classifier construction.  By properly addressing these 
issues, the researchers were able to develop an effective decision support system for audit 
planning.  The hot spots methodology, introduced by Williams and Huang, involved clustering to 
provide a first cut segmentation of the data [40].  Using C4.5 and C5.0, decision tree induction 
and rule set pruning then assigned a rule to each segment of the data.  These rules, coupled with 
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the original data, were analyzed to find “nuggets,” subsets of the original data, which were 
related in some way to the domain problem. 
 
2.2.4 Logistic Regression 
 
 Shin, Park, Lee, and Jhee proposed a scoring model for a South Korean governmental 
health insurance agency that detected outpatient clinics with abusive utilization patterns based on 
profiling information extracted from electronic insurance claims [34].  Their model consisted of 
scoring claims to quantify the degree of abusiveness and segmentation to categorize the 
problematic providers with similar utilization patterns.  Practitioner claims submitted to the 
South Korean National Health Insurance Corporation (NHIC) for outpatient care during the 3rd 
quarter of 2007 were used to construct the model, and data from the 4th quarter of 2007 was used 
to validate the model.  They compared the conditional probability distributions of the composite 
degree of anomaly (CDA) score formulated for intervention and non-intervention groups.  The 
CDA aggregated 38 indicators of abusiveness for individual clinics, which were grouped based 
on the CDAs.  This combination of logistic regression and CDAs allowed Shin, Park, Lee, and 
Jhee to improve upon the performance of existing fraud detection methods.  As previously 
mentioned, the detection performance of logistic regression was analyzed alongside neural 
networks and classification trees by Liou, Tang, and Chen [22].  They determined while 
classifications trees had an overall correct identification rate of 99%, neural networks had an 
overall correct identification rate of 96%, and logistic regression had an overall correct 
identification rate of 92%, all three algorithms performed quite accurately.   
 
 We chose to implement logistic regression models as the supervised, predictive element 
of our fraud detection system due to their comparative simplicity.  Although both classification 
trees and neural networks were found to be more accurate, we discovered that they were much 
more difficult to develop and implement.  The straightforwardness of this statistical model 
allowed us to closely monitor the addition and subtraction of covariates, and there were multiple 
existing functions in R packages that performed logistic regression.   
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2.3 Statistical Modeling Involving Unsupervised Learning 
 
Unsupervised learning is a category of machine learning algorithms that uses unknown 
data to draw inferences.  An unknown dataset consists of input data instances without labeled 
responses, meaning the latent variable is unknown.  Using only the information provided by the 
input attributes, unsupervised learning algorithms develop models that attempt to discover 
hidden structure in the unlabeled data.  Values are assigned to the response variable according to 
the structure and patterns of the data that are found by the unsupervised learning algorithm. 
 
2.3.1 Cluster Analysis 
 
 The purpose of cluster analysis is to group data into categories, classes, or clusters, so 
that items within a particular cluster are similar in comparison to one another, but significantly 
dissimilar to items in other clusters.  By clustering elements of a set into two or more mutually 
exclusive groups, it becomes more manageable to predict behavior or properties based on group 
membership.  A data matrix must first be constructed, where each medical claim is represented 
by a row, and each feature of the claim is stored a column.  Then, a table of relative similarities 
or differences between all the claims can be developed, which is called the proximities matrix.  
Within this matrix, both the rows and columns represent individual claims, and the value of each 
element is a measurement of the similarity or difference between the two particular claims.  The 
measure of similarity on which the clusters are eventually modeled can be defined by Euclidean 
distance, probabilistic distance, or other appropriate metrics.  After the distances between all the 
claims have been found, clustering occurs based on these distances.  A clustering algorithm, such 
as Hierarchical clustering (HCA), k-means clustering, Gaussian mixture models, or Self-
organizing maps (SOM), is responsible for properly dividing the claims into clusters.  In the 
application of fraud detection, claims within clusters containing seemingly abnormal feature 
values are typically flagged as fraudulent.  Researchers have used various clustering algorithms 
to detect different forms of healthcare fraud through cluster analysis.  Demographically 
homogenous zip code regions were created using clustering procedures, and each zip code region 
was associated with a random variable that could discriminate between health care utilization. 
[25].  He, Graco, and Yao coupled the K-nearest neighbor (KNN) algorithm with a genetic 
algorithm to detect Australian medical fraud [14].  The genetic algorithm determined the optimal 
weights of features used to categorize General Practitioners’ practice profiles, and the KNN 
algorithm used these weights to identify nearest neighbors.  The results of this experiment were 
promising, and the researchers recommended the implementation of this model in the Health 
Insurance Commission’s fraud prevention system (fps).  Within the UNISIM system, proposed 
by Tang, Mendis, Murray, Hu, and Sutinen, the framework consisted of a feature extractor, a 
cluster builder, a model constructor, and an outlier detector [36].  The purpose of the cluster 
analysis within this system was to examine and label the data according to certain criteria.  Every 
sequence was first initialized as a cluster, nearest neighbors were merged based on density of 
sequences, and a second merging process occurred based on the density of the clusters.  Overall, 
the unsupervised UNISIM system was proven to be an effective, yet complementary tool in the 
detection of healthcare fraud. 
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2.3.2 Association Rules 
 
In an elemental sense, association rules are if/then statements that allow relationships 
between seemingly unrelated data attributes to be exposed.  An antecedent, the “if”, and a 
consequent, the “then”, are the two components of an association rule.  Antecedents are the 
values of certain data attributes, and consequences are other feature values that are found in 
combination with a particular antecedent.  The association rules themselves are developed by 
analyzing the data for frequent reasoning patterns, and then using the criteria support and 
confidence to determine the most significant relationships.  Criteria support indicates how 
frequently the antecedent and consequent appear in the data, and confidence indicates the 
number of times the antecedent/consequent combination has been found to be true.  In the 
application of fraud detection, medical claims that lack correspondence to any existing 
association rules would be flagged as abnormal and further investigation would occur.  The 
detection of provider fraud through specialist billing was studied by Shan, Jeacocke, Murray, and 
Sutinen using positive and negative association rules [31].  Rules were first identified by the 
researchers, and then classified into two groups representing compliance and non-compliance by 
a domain expert.  Any claims that were not consistent with the compliance rules were considered 
to be potentially fraudulent.  This method was tested against a baseline classifier, and these rules 
were validated after significantly outperforming the baseline.  Another Australian researcher, 
Williams, coupled rule induction and clustering to detect various forms of insurance subscribers’ 
fraud [39].  This research is closely related to research that Williams conducted with Huang two 
years earlier in 1997.  The results from [40] have already been discussed in Section 2.2.3. 
 
2.3.3 Anomaly Detection 
 
 Anomaly detection, or outlier detection, is the identification of cases which do not 
conform to an expected pattern, or that are unusual within data that is seemingly homogeneous.  
This statistical method performs quite well as a detection tool, because it was developed to 
recognize rare events that may have great significance, but are hard to find within a large set of 
data.  Unsupervised anomaly detection techniques detect anomalies in an unlabeled test data set 
under the assumption that the majority of the instances in the data set are normal by looking for 
instances that seem to fit least to the remainder of the data set.  The distance from the center of a 
normal distribution indicates how typical a given point is with respect to the distribution of the 
data.  Each case can be ranked according to the probability that it is either typical or atypical.  
Capelleveen tested the performance of an outlier detection method by analyzing its precision 
predicting dental fraud [5].  Local density based outlier detection was used by Shan, Murray, and 
Sutinen to study fraudulent Optometrist billing patterns, and by Tang, Mendis, Murray, Hu, and 
Sutinen in conjunction with feature selection, clustering, and pattern recognition in their 
proposed UNISIM system [32, 36].   
 
Ngufor and Wojtusiak established the unsupervised data labeling capability of outlier 
detection, and proposed a SynTwoMoving algorithm to label fraudulent healthcare data, which 
incorporated concept drift [27].  Using this research as inspiration, we decided to label our 
training data using an anomaly detection algorithm that incorporated this aspect of seasonality. 
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3 Data Source and Preprocessing 
3.1 Methodology  
 
Since the emergence of the Electronic Health Record (EHR) and the subsequent increase 
in the electronic submission of healthcare insurance claims, several states have established 
databases that collect health insurance claims information from all paying entities into a 
statewide information repository.  The All-Payer Claims Databases (APCD) contain medical, 
dental, and pharmaceutical claims data that can be used to report cost, use, and quality 
information.  The stored data is service-level information based on claims that have been 
processed by various payers.  Information considered to be service-level includes charges and 
payments, the providers receiving payment, clinical diagnosis and procedure codes, and patient 
demographics.  The various payers include private health insurance companies, federally-funded 
agencies such as Medicare and Medicaid, state employee health benefit programs, prescription 
drug plans, dental insurance companies, and self-insured employer plans.  At this time, ten states 
have existing All-Payer Claims Databases: Colorado, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Maryland, 
Minnesota, New Hampshire, Tennessee, Utah, and Vermont.  Most states offer limited use 
datasets containing certain identifying features, and public use datasets that ensure patient 
privacy by encrypting, aggregating, or suppressing all patient identifiers.  We obtained the public 
use APCD dataset for this research project from the New Hampshire Comprehensive Health 
Care Information System (NHCHIS). 
 
Once we received the dataset from Milliman, the vendor responsible for collecting, 
cleaning, imputing, and transforming the data from the New Hampshire APCD, our first course 
of action was to determine the types of fraud we could potentially detect using the information 
provided by attributes in the data.  After performing some basic analysis to become familiar with 
the data, we decided to focus on detecting claims that billed for services not rendered or billed 
for excessive or unnecessary services.  The results from this initial data analysis are discussed in 
Section 3.2. 
 
Features of the dataset were then selected that would provide the algorithms being used 
with the necessary information to identify instances of these fraudulent schemes.  The predicting 
capability of each available attribute was evaluated using literature written by domain experts 
and the methodologies from previous research projects.  The results of the feature selection 
process, which provided the data elements for both the outlier detection and logistic regression 
models, are included in Sections 5 and 6.   
 
During the data auditing process, we learned that the vendor had redacted the exact 
submission date of each claim due to privacy concerns.  Time-series data was an input 
requirement for the outlier detection package that had been chosen, so this lack of any temporal 
indicator was troubling.  Thankfully, we were able to determine through additional analysis that 
the imputed service key value, generated by the vendor, was assigned to each claim according to 
when the claim was processed and stored.  This value was used to create a sort of pseudo-time-
stamp, and allowed us to organize the data in a sequential manner.   
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The amount billed for each service record was also evaluated, and we discovered that this 
currency field can be negative when a claim is reversed.  Healthcare fraud is monetarily 
motivated, so these type of records were eliminated from the dataset. 
 
3.2 Data Analysis 
 
The following experiment was conducted using a dataset from the New Hampshire 
Comprehensive Health Care Information System (NHCHIS), an APCD system that is maintained 
by the New Hampshire Insurance Department and the New Hampshire Department of Health and 
Human Services.  The NHCHIS began accepting claims submissions from paying entities in 
2005, and currently collects medical claims data from commercial payers, third-party 
administrators, Medicaid, and Medicare.  We originally requested and received public use data 
from 2005 through 2014, but eventually focused on claims from 2012 and 2013, due to their 
recentness and completeness.   
 
 After importing the two years’ worth of NHCHIS information into a SQL Server 
database, the structure of the data was analyzed.  Each row in the table represents a service that 
was provided and is being billed for by a provider within a healthcare insurance claim.  An 
individual service record in a claim can be uniquely identified by a service key, which was 
generated by the warehouse during the data transformation process.  Medical claims, containing 
one or more service records, can be uniquely identified by a claim key that was assigned by 
Milliman.  Each claim describes the services rendered by a healthcare provider for an individual 
patient during a particular period of time. 
 
 Including the claim and service keys, a single record is comprised of 63 data attributes 
that describe the patient, the provider, the situation, the services provided, billing information, 
insurance information, etc.  Seven of the elements are identification keys that were generated by 
the vendor for confidentiality or reference purposes.  The other 56 elements of each row are 
directly extracted from the claims data supplied by the healthcare insurance agencies and 
companies cooperating with the NHCHIS. 
 
 Outpatient claims describing care that was provided to a patient who was not formally 
admitted to a healthcare facility can be distinguished from inpatient claims according to certain 
data attributes.  Records containing non-null ICD-9 Procedure codes (ICD_PROC_01_PRI) are 
classified as inpatient, while records with non-null CPT/HCPCS codes (PROC_CODE) are 
considered to be outpatient.  An inpatient flag (INPATIENT_FLAG) also indicates whether a 
given service record is from an inpatient claim.  
 
 This project is motivated by the transition from ICD-9 to ICD-10, and inpatient claims 
face a far more dramatic change, since both the diagnosis and procedure codes will be 
transitioning.  Therefore, we excluded outpatient claims from this experiment, and concentrated 
solely on testing inpatient claims.  
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4 Clinical Classification Software 
 
4.1 Clinical Classification Methodology 
 
Developed by the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), Clinical 
Classifications Software (CCS) is a tool for clustering patient diagnoses and procedures into a 
more manageable number of clinically meaningful categories.  CCS provides a way to classify 
diagnoses and procedures into a limited number of categories by aggregating individual ICD-9 
and ICD-10 diagnosis, ICD-9 and ICD-10 procedure, and Current Procedural Terminology 
(CPT)/Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) codes into broad diagnosis and 
procedure groups to facilitate statistical analysis and reporting.  This grouping process makes it 
easier to understand patterns of diagnoses and procedures so that organizations and researchers 
can analyze costs, utilization, and outcomes associated with particular illnesses and procedures.  
Single-level CCS categories, which are mutually exclusive, can be employed in many types of 
projects analyzing data on diagnoses and procedures. For example, they can be used to3: 
 
• Identify cases for disease-specific or procedure-specific studies 
 
• Gain a better understanding of an institution's or health plan's distribution of patients 
across disease or procedure groupings 
 
• Provide statistical information on characteristics, such as charges and length of stay, 
about relatively specific conditions 
 
• Cross-classify procedures by diagnoses to provide insight into the variety of 
procedures performed for particular diagnoses. 
 
4.1.1 ICD-9 and ICD-10 Diagnosis Codes 
 
The single-level ICD-9 and ICD-10 diagnosis classification schemes both aggregate 
mortality and morbidity into 285 mutually exclusive categories, most of which are clinically 
homogeneous. Some heterogeneous categories are necessary; these combine several less 
common individual conditions within a body system.  Table 1 provides an example of a row in 
the crosswalk from a group of analogous ICD-9 diagnosis codes to a single-level CCS category. 
 
Table 1: Example of the Single-Level CCS Diagnosis Crosswalk 
Description ICD-9 Diagnosis Codes CCS Category 
HIV infection 042 0420 0421 0422 0429 
0430 0431 0432 0433 0439 
0440 0449 07953 27910 
27919 79571 7958 V08 
5 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  https://www.hcup-­‐us.ahrq.gov/toolssoftware/ccs/ccs.jsp	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4.1.2 ICD-9 and ICD-10 Procedure Codes 
 
Single-level ICD-9 and ICD-10 procedure classification schemes both contain 231 
mutually exclusive categories. ICD-9 and ICD-10 procedure codes are only used to describe 
services in inpatient records and claims.  The term inpatient refers to any procedure that requires 
a patient to be admitted to a hospital, so the patient can be closely monitored during the 
procedure and recovery process.  Many of the categories represent single procedures; however, 
some procedures that occur infrequently are grouped according to three dimensions: the relevant 
body system, whether they are used for diagnostic or therapeutic purposes, and whether they are 
considered operating room or non-operating room procedures, according to diagnosis related 
groups (DRG) definitions.  Table 2 provides an example of a single row from the ICD-9 CCS 
procedure crosswalk. 
 
Table 2: Example of the Single-Level CCS ICD-9 Procedure Crosswalk 
Description ICD-9 Procedure Codes CCS Category 
Heart Valve Procedures 3500 3501 3502 3503 3504 
3505 3506 3507 3508 3509 
3510 3511 3512 3513 3514 
3520 3521 3522 3523 3524 
3525 3526 3527 3528 3596 
3597 3599 
43 
 
4.1.3 CPT/HCPCS Codes 
  
 The CCS also provides a crosswalk for classifying Current Procedural Terminology 
(CPT) codes and Healthcare Common Procedure Coding System (HCPCS) codes into procedure 
categories.  CPT, also referred to as HCPCS Level I, is used to describe outpatient procedures 
performed by healthcare professionals.  An outpatient procedure does not require hospital 
admission, and may be performed off-site.  HCPCS, also referred to as HCPCS Level II, is a 
supplementary coding system developed by the CMS to designate supplies and services not 
accounted for in the CPT code set.  More than 9,000 CPT codes and 6,000 HCPCS codes are 
grouped into 244 categories.  Of these 244 categories, 231 are identical to the ICD-9 procedure 
categories, and 13 are specific groups unique to the service and supply codes in the CPT/HCPCS 
coding system.  Instead of providing a crosswalk for each individual CPT/HCPCS code, CCS-
Services and Procedures classifies according to ranges of code values, which is illustrated in 
Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Example of the CCS-Services and Procedures Crosswalk 
CPT/HCPCS Codes CCS Category Description 
‘71250 – 71275’ 
‘75571 – 75573’ 
‘S8032 – S8032’ 
‘S8093 – S8093’ 
178 CT scan chest 
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In every CCS crosswalk, the diagnosis and procedure codes are represented with implicit 
decimals, which is fairly regular in the vast majority of healthcare data.  In practice, ICD-9 and 
ICD-10 codes are usually represented with explicit decimals, as mentioned in Section 1.1. 
 
4.2 Clinical Classification Results 
 
 For this experiment, the claims data from 2012 was used as training data, and the claims 
data from 2013 was used as the testing data.  Using the CCS clinical classification schemes, each 
service record was categorized according to the primary diagnosis and primary procedure codes.  
This was done to appropriately group service records that have similar medical codes into 
distinct categories that would have similar bill amounts and quantities of services provided. 
Statistical analysis could then be performed in the future stages according to the CCS diagnosis 
and CCS procedure categories.  The crosswalks described in Section 4.1 were used to assign 
each inpatient service record a diagnosis group number and a procedure group number.  After all 
the inpatient claims from both years were grouped according to CCS Diagnosis/CCS Procedure 
combinations, the four groups with the largest number of claims, services, distinct diagnosis 
codes, and distinct procedure codes from 2012 were ultimately selected.   
 
Table 4: 2012 IDC-9 Clinical Classification 
CCS 
Diagnosis 
CCS 
Procedure 
Number 
of Claims 
Number of 
Services 
Number of Distinct 
ICD-9 Diagnosis 
Codes 
Number of Distinct 
ICD-9 Procedure 
Codes 
203 152 1569 22845 10 2 
193 140 1027 7640 11 2 
205 158 647 8157 22 13 
149 84 585 8180 26 4 
 
 The same four CCS combinations from the 2013 inpatient claims were then selected, and 
the service records from each group were stored in a separate database table.  
 
Table 5: 2013 ICD-9 Clinical Classification 
CCS 
Diagnosis 
CCS 
Procedure 
Number 
of Claims 
Number of 
Services 
Number of Distinct 
ICD-9 Diagnosis 
Codes 
Number of Distinct 
ICD-9 Procedure 
Codes 
203 152 1959 28686 8 2 
193 140 990 7172 8 3 
205 158 607 7930 26 13 
149 84 475 6540 25 3 
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5 Outlier Detection 
 
5.1 Outlier Detection Methodology 
 
 In January 2015, Twitter released an open-source R package, AnomalyDetection, which 
has the ability to detect anomalies in big data.  Considered to be both practical and robust, this 
package is intended to identify outliers in a set of time series data, and is cognizant of both 
seasonality and underlying trends.  Positive, negative, global, and local anomalies can all be 
detected using the AnomalyDetection package.  The use of time series decomposition and a 
robust statistical metric allows the package to detect this range of anomalies.  The underlying 
algorithm, referred to as Seasonal Hybrid ESD, builds upon the Generalized ESD test for 
detecting anomalies.  For long time series, the algorithm employs piecewise approximation, 
since the issue of trend extraction in the presence of anomalies is non-trivial, during the detection 
process. 
 
This package was originally designed for time series data, but can also be used to detect 
anomalies in a vector of numerical values.  This is extremely useful when the data is ordered 
according to time, but the corresponding timestamps are not available. AnomalyDetection allows 
the user to specify the direction of anomalies, the window of interest, enable/disable piecewise 
approximation, and annotate the axes to assist in visual data representation and analysis.  The 
framework of Twitter’s AnomalyDetection package is explained in the following subsections. 
 
5.1.1 Student T-Distribution 
 
Suppose we select a random sample of size n from a normal population with mean µ and 
variance σ2.  Let 𝑥 represent the sample mean, and s represent the sample standard deviation.  
Then the random variable: 
 
 𝑇!!! =    !!  !!!   has a t-distribution with n - 1 degrees of freedom.  (1) 
 
This probability distribution is typically used to estimate population parameters when the 
population variance is unknown, or the sample size is small.  When n is large (n > 40), a t-
statistic will approximately follow a normal distribution, according to Central Limit Theory. 
Often, the population standard deviation is unknown, but the sample standard deviation can be 
calculated.  The t-distribution allows researchers to conduct statistical analysis on this type of 
datasets using the normal distribution.  As the degrees of freedom increases, the t-density 
approaches the normal density.  This corresponds to the fact that the sample standard deviation s 
approaches the population standard deviation σ for large n.  When the degrees of freedom is 
equal to 1,000, the critical values for the t-distribution are extremely close to the critical z-values 
(1.962 versus 1.96, for example).   
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T-density curves are also symmetric and bell-shaped like the normal distribution.  However, 
the spread is more than that of the normal distribution.  This is due to the fact that in equation 4, 
the denominator is s rather than σ.  Since s is a random quantity varying with various samples, 
Tn-1 has a higher degree of uncertainty, resulting in a larger spread. 
 
5.1.2 Generalized ESD Test 
 
The Generalized Extreme Studentized Deviate (ESD) test is used to detect one or more 
outliers in univariate data that follows an approximately normal distribution.  The primary 
limitation of the Grubbs’ test, the standard ESD test, is that the suspected number of outliers, k, 
must be specified exactly by the researcher.  If k is not set correctly, this can cause the 
conclusion of the test to be misleading.  The generalized derivation of the ESD test only requires 
that an upper bound for the suspected number of outliers be specified.  Given this upper bound, r, 
the Generalized ESD test performs r separate tests: a test for one outlier, a test for two outliers, a 
test of three outliers, etc., testing up to r outliers.  
 
The Generalized ESD test is defined using the following null and alternative hypotheses: 
 
H0: There are no outliers in the dataset 
H1: There are between 1 and r outliers in the dataset 
 
Test Statistic:  
 
 𝑅! =   !"#!   !!!  !!           (2) 
 
For the test statistic Ri, 𝑥 and s denote the sample mean and the sample standard deviation.  The 
numerator 𝑚𝑎𝑥!    𝑥! −   𝑥  indicates the point farthest away from the sample mean.   
 
Using the sample data, the observation that maximizes 𝑥! −   𝑥  is removed, and the test 
statistic is recomputed with n - 1 observations, resulting in the recalculation of the sample mean 
and sample standard deviation.  This iterative procedure is repeated until r observations have 
been removed.  At the conclusion of this process, r test statistics have been constructed, R1, R2, 
R3 …, Rr. 
 
Critical Region: For each of the r test statistics: 
 𝜆! =    !!!   !!,!!!!!!!!!!!  !!,!!!!!! (!!!!!)  i = 1, 2, 3, …, r    (3) 
 
The variable n represents the sample size of the dataset, and tp,n –i-1 is the 100p critical value of 
the t-distribution with n – i – 1 degrees of freedom.  The variable p is equal to:  
 𝑝 = 1 −    !!  (!!!!!)    α = designated significance level  (4) 
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The number of outliers is ultimately determined by finding the largest i, such that the test statistic 
Ri is greater than the critical value λi. 
 
5.1.3 Seasonality 
 
The Generalized ESD test requires input data that follows an approximately normal 
distribution, but real-world time series data frequently has seasonality, regular or semi-regular 
cyclic variations that can affect statistical analysis.  Seasonal Trend Decomposition using 
Locally-Weighted Scatterplot Smoothing (STL), designed to handle fixed seasonal periods, splits 
time series data into three separate elements: a seasonal component, a trend component, and a 
remainder component.  The seasonal component of the original data is found using Locally-
Weighted Scatterplot Smoothing (LOESS).  The primary purpose of LOESS is the removal of 
“jaggedness” from data using local regression.  These seasonal values are removed from the data, 
and the trend component is found by smoothing the remaining data.  The remainder component, 
the residual data produced by removing both the seasonal and trend components, follows an 
approximately normal distribution.  The Generalized ESD test can then be applied to this 
remaining data in order to detect anomalies.  
 
5.2 Outlier Detection Results 
 
The AnomalyDetectionTs function, found in Twitter’s AnomalyDetection package, 
detects anomalies in seasonal univariate time series data where the input is a series of 
<timestamp, observation> pairs.  This technique requires the timestamp to be in the YYYY-MM-
DD HH-MM-SS format.  Our pseudo-timestamp generated from the imputed service key did 
provide a temporal indictor, but was not in a standard timestamp format.  Therefore, the 
AnomalyDetectionVec function, which does not require a timestamp input, was used instead.  
Outliers can still be identified in seasonal univariate time series data, but the input is a series of 
observations in sequential order. 
 
 According to previous methodologies, most supervised learning fraud detection systems 
that have been used by researchers rely on training data that has each claim, not each service 
record within a claim, identified as fraudulent or non-fraudulent [8, 9].  Therefore, during this 
data labeling process, the sum of the amounts billed divided by the quantities for the service 
records within an individual claim was identified as the primary feature for the univariate outlier 
detection process.  Dividing the amount billed by the quantity of services, and summing these 
results for each claim provided a normalized total amount value that could be properly compared 
to other total values. 
 
 For each of the four CCS Diagnosis/Procedure combinations, the claims were ordered in 
ascending order according to their imputed service key.  After the claims were in proper 
chronological order, the corresponding sums of the amounts billed divided by the quantities for 
the claims were stored in four separate R dataframes.  The AnomalyDetectionVec function was 
then used to detect anomalies according to the total bill amount.  Claims that were identified as 
anomalies by this package were marked as fraud in the SQL Server database. 
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Table 6: Anomaly Detection Variables 
Parameter Description Parameter Value 
X Time series as a column data frame, list, or vector, 
where the column consists of the observations 
List of !"#$%&  !"##$%!"#$%&%'  
max_anoms Maximum number of anomalies that S-H-ESD will 
detect as a percentage of the data 
0.05 (5%) 
direction Directionality of the anomalies to be detected Positive 
alpha The level of statistical significance with which to accept 
or reject anomalies 
0.05 
period Defines the number of observations in a single period, 
and used during seasonal decomposition 
#  of  Claims12  
 
 The AnomalyDetectionVec function requires a number of input values that were 
subsequently used in the Seasonal Hybrid ESD test.  The maximum number of anomalies as a 
percentage of the data was set to 0.05, or 5%, for this detection process.  This threshold 
corresponds to the results published by Liou, Tang, and Chen, which indicated that 3% to 4% of 
healthcare claims were fraudulent or abusive [22].  Other research groups uncovered similar 
levels of fraud, ranging anywhere from 0.8% to 10% [17, 28].  We did not dynamically test this 
threshold value during our experiment, because this process of detecting outliers was used 
simply for unsupervised labeling for supervised learning purposes, not for the final detection of 
fraudulent instances.  The directionality of the anomalies was set as positive, since healthcare 
fraud is motivated by monetary gain.  The alpha level was set as 0.05, indicating that anomalies 
would be selected or rejected with a 95% confidence level.  The period, which defines the 
number of observations per period and is used during seasonal decomposition, was determined 
by dividing the total number of claims by twelve.  The anomaly results for each group can be 
found below in Table 7.   
 
Table 7: CCS Outlier Detection Results 
CCS 
Diagnosis 
CCS 
Procedure 
Fraudulent 
Claims 
Total 
Claims 
Percent 
Fraudulent 
Fraudulent 
Services 
Total 
Services 
Percent 
Fraudulent 
203 152 13 1569 0.83 227 22845 0.99 
193 140 51 1027 4.97 498 7640 6.52 
205 158 29 647 4.48 309 8157 3.79 
149 84 10 585 1.71 323 8180 3.95 
TOTALS: 103 3828 2.69 1357 46822 2.90 
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6 ICD-9 and ICD-10 General Equivalence Mappings 
  
6.1 General Equivalence Mapping Methodology 
 
General Equivalence Mappings (GEMs) are medical coding crosswalks that were 
developed and published by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services4.  With the 
implementation date of the tenth medical classification revision nearing, GEMs are practical and 
useful translational dictionaries that provide acceptable ICD-10 alternatives to ICD-9 codes, and 
vice-versa.  The intention of these mappings is to offer translations that preserve the complete 
meaning of the original medical codes being translated. 
 
 The upcoming transition to ICD-10 will not affect every type of medical code.  ICD-9 
diagnosis codes will be replaced by ICD-10 diagnosis codes, ICD-9 procedure codes will be 
replaced by ICD-10 procedure codes, but CPT/HCPCS codes will remain the same.  Therefore, 
translational crosswalks only exist for ICD-9 diagnosis and procedure codes. 
 
While determining the target codes that would correspond to potential source codes, the 
CMS attempted to honor the National Library of Medicine (NLM) standard regarding the 
conversion between coding systems.  The NLM believes although it is possible to accurately 
map from specific concepts to more general concepts, it is impossible to use mappings to add 
specificity when the original information only addresses general concepts. However, this NLM 
standard does not supersede the primary purpose of the GEM, which is to provide an acceptable 
translation for every source system code in both code sets.  These mappings do include target 
system alternatives that are more specific than the source system when better alternatives are not 
available.  Therefore, the crosswalks between ICD-9 and ICD-10 diagnosis and procedure codes 
contain one-to-one, one-to-many, and many-to-one mappings.  Even though non-optimal one-to-
many mappings exist, each target code is considered to be an acceptable translation of the source 
code by the CMS. 
 
Tables 8 and 9 provide sample rows from both the diagnosis and procedure mapping 
schemes.  The Source column contains ICD-9 codes, and the Target column yields the equivalent 
ICD-10 code(s) for each ICD-9 code.  These tables also illustrate the two possible cases that 
could occur during translation: one-to-one mappings and one-to-many mappings.  
 
Table 8: Example of a One-to-One ICD-9 Procedure Mapping 
ICD-9 Code (Source) ICD-10 Code (Target) 
5283 0FYG0Z2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  http://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Coding/ICD10/index.html	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Table 9: Example of a One-to-Many ICD-9 Diagnosis Mapping 
ICD-9 Code (Source) ICD-10 Code (Target) 
07989 B338 
07989 B341 
07989 B342 
07989 B344 
07989 B348 
07989 B9719 
07989 B9729 
07989 B9789 
 
6.2 General Equivalence Mapping Results 
 
 After the GEM crosswalks had been imported in the database, the diagnosis and 
procedure codes from each individual service were translated from ICD-9 to ICD-10 using basic 
SQL join statements.  The original ICD-9 data from the four selected CCS combinations is 
described in Table 10.  Table 11 contains information regarding the corresponding ICD-10 data 
that was derived from the Table 10 data.  Certain CCS groups, such as 149/84, had little to no 
one-to-many mappings, while others, such as 205/158, produced a significant number of one-to-
many mappings. 
 
Table 10: ICD-9 Pre-General Equivalency Mapping 
CCS 
Diagnosis 
CCS 
Procedure 
Number 
of Claims 
Number of 
Services 
Number of Distinct 
ICD-10 Diagnosis 
Codes 
Number of Distinct 
ICD-10 Procedure 
Codes 
203 152 1959 28686 8 2 
193 140 990 7172 8 3 
205 158 607 7930 26 13 
149 84 475 6540 25 3 
 
Table 11: ICD-10 Post-General Equivalency Mapping 
CCS 
Diagnosis 
CCS 
Procedure 
Number 
of Claims 
Number of 
Services 
Number of Distinct 
ICD-10 Diagnosis 
Codes 
Number of Distinct 
ICD-10 Procedure 
Codes 
203 152 1959 516807 8 26 
193 140 990 71088 8 28 
205 158 607 311777 37 313 
149 84 475 6540 25 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24	  
	  
7 Logistic Regression 
 
7.1 Logistic Regression Methodology 
 
 The statistical process of logistic regression models the relationship between the 
dependent variable and one or more independent feature variables from the data.  Both the fit of 
the model as well as the significance of the relationships between the dependent and independent 
variables can be analyzed using this approach.  Its ultimate purpose is to estimate the probability 
of an event occurring, such as the probability a particular claim being fraudulent.  However, the 
dependent variable, predicted using the probability ascertained from the relevant independent 
variables, is not a precise numerical value.  The dependent variable is typically dichotomous in a 
logistic regressive setting, so the outcome can either be a “1,” signaling that the claim is 
fraudulent for example, or a “0,” indicating non-fraudulence.   
 
For this project, a multivariate logistic regression model is used.  Let π(x) represent the 
probability of an event that depends on p independent variables.  Then, using the inverse logit for 
modeling the probability: 
 𝜋 𝑥 =    !!!!!!!!!!!!!!⋯!!!!!!!  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!⋯!!!!!       (5) 
 
This form is identical to univariate logistic regression, but there is now more than one 
independent variable.  To obtain the corresponding logit function from this, let X represent the 
set of covariates X1, X2, …, Xp and using basic algebra: 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝜋 𝑋 = ln    ! !!!  ! !            (6) 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝜋 𝑋 = ln    !!!!!!!!!!!!!!⋯!!!!!!!  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!⋯!!!!!!!   !!!!!!!!!!!!!!⋯!!!!!!!  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!⋯!!!!!           
 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝜋 𝑋 = ln    !!!!!!!!!!!!!!⋯!!!!!!!  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!⋯!!!!!   !!!  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!⋯!!!!!             
 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝜋 𝑋 = ln[𝑒!!!!!!!!!!!!!⋯!!!!!]      
 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 𝜋 𝑋 =   𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑋! + 𝛽!𝑋! +⋯+ 𝛽!𝑋!     (7) 
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 Just like univariate logistic regression, the probability of a binary event given X is a 
simple linear function.  Equation 5 calculates the probability of an outcome event given the 
covariate values X1 through Xp.  Using logit transformation to convert the dichotomous outcome, 
Equation 7 becomes a standard linear regression model.  Logit transformation changes the range 
of π(x) from 0 to 1 to -∞ to ∞. 
 
7.2 Logistic Regression Results 
 
The manufacturing of the labeled training data using the anomaly detection process 
discussed in Section 5 allowed us to use supervised learning methods to predict probable 
instances of fraud in inpatient claims from 2013.  The glm function from the R package stats was 
used to construct a logistic regression model for each CCS diagnosis/procedure grouping using 
the 2012 training data.  The appropriate model was then applied to the corresponding ICD-9 data 
from 2013, and service records with a probability greater than 0.1, or 10%, were flagged.  The 
covariates used within the logistic regression models are listed below. 
 
1. Primary ICD Diagnosis Code 
2. Primary ICD Procedure Code 
3. Amount Billed 
4. Quantity 
5. !"#$%&  !"##$%!"#$%&%'  
6. Discharge Status 
7. Age 
8. Sex 
 
The logit formula uses covariates from the data to calculate the probability of fraud.  
These independent variables were selected according to the logic of Diagnosis-Related Grouping 
(DRG), a system of clinical classification that is used by Medicare, Medicaid, and private 
insurance companies to determine the appropriate cost of inpatient services.  DRG labels are 
assigned through a black box based on the primary ICD-9 diagnosis code, the primary ICD-9 
procedure code, the age of the patient, the sex of the patient, the discharge status, and the 
presence of complications or comorbidities.  Fraud detection researchers have previously used 
DRGs coupled with the amount billed to detect instances of healthcare fraud [19, 22].  Every 
data attribute contributing to DRG classification, with the exception of the presence of 
complications, was present in our data.  Ideally, a variable indicating complications would have 
also been used, but the absence of this particular variable did not impact the predictive power of 
the other DRG-related metrics.  These independent variables, along with the cost, quantity, and 
the subtotal, which was calculated by dividing the cost by the quantity, were selected as the 
covariates for the logistic regression analysis.  The coefficients section of the summary describes 
each of the covariates that were used in the regression function.  In Table 12 below, the diagnosis 
code, the procedure code, the quantity, the subtotal, the discharge status, the age of the patient, 
and the sex of the patient were all determined to be statistically significant predictors, according 
to the p-values provided in the Associated P-Value column.   
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Table 12: CCS 205/158 ICD-9 Logistic Regression Model 
Covariate Wald Z-Statistic Associated P-Value Significance 
Intercept -5.213 1.86 x 10-7 *** 
Diagnosis Code -10.654 < 2 x 10-16 *** 
Procedure Code 5.205 1.94 x 10-7 *** 
Amount Billed -0.640 0.52216   
Quantity -2.957 0.00311 ** 
Normalized Claim Total 5.951 2.67 x 10-9 *** 
Discharge Status 2.038 0.04155 * 
Age -5.918 3.27 x 10-9 *** 
Sex -7.290 3.09 x 10-13 *** 
 
 
Table 13: CCS 205/158 ICD-10 Logistic Regression Model 
Covariate Wald Z-Statistic Associated P-Value Significance 
Intercept -2.617 0.008858 ** 
Amount Billed -0.759 0.447837   
Quantity -3.406 0.000658 *** 
Normalized Claim Total 5.411 6.27 x 10-8 *** 
Discharge Status 1.754 0.079472 . 
Age -7.376 1.64 x 10-13 *** 
Sex -8.927 < 2 x 10-16 *** 
 
 These logistic regression models were also used to predict the probability of fraud for the 
service records in the four CCS groups from the 2013 inpatient claims that had been translated to 
ICD-10.  Since the models were trained using ICD-9 training data, the factor levels for the 
primary diagnosis code and primary procedure code only contained ICD-9 codes.  The models 
adjusted to the introduction of ICD-10 by dropping the diagnosis code and procedure code as 
predictors, relying on the remaining six covariates to calculate the probability of fraud. 
 
 This logistic regression model was trained using the same CCS 205/158 training data, but 
eliminated the diagnosis and procedure codes from the formula.  The discharge status becomes 
less statistically significant and the quantity becomes more statistically significant, which can be 
seen in Table 13.  The loss of these two covariates does affect the predicting power and accuracy 
of the model, and this notion is established in the following subsection.   
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8 Results 
 
8.1 ICD-9 versus ICD-10 
 
 The logistic regression models developed for the ICD-9 testing data used the eight 
covariates mentioned earlier to predict the probability of service records being fraudulent.  Any 
service with a probability greater than or equal to 0.1 was flagged in the database. 
 
Table : ICD-9 Fraud Results 
CCS 
Diagnosis 
CCS 
Procedure 
Number of 
Fraudulent Services 
Total Number of 
Services 
Percent 
Fraudulent (%) 
203 152 86 28686 0.30 
193 140 771 7172 10.75 
205 158 453 7930 5.71 
149 84 374 6540 5.72 
 
 The adjusted regression analysis relied on six covariates to detect possible fraud in the 
same testing data that was used for the ICD-9 test.  Since the CCS classification software uses 
the same categories for ICD-9 and ICD-10 and every ICD-10 equivalent mapped to the expected 
CCS group with 100% accuracy, the data was reduced down to the ICD-9 testing data, minus the 
diagnosis and procedure codes, which eliminated the repetition of services.   
 
Table : ICD-10 Fraud Results 
CCS 
Diagnosis 
CCS 
Procedure 
Number of 
Fraudulent Services 
Total Number of 
Services 
Percent 
Fraudulent (%) 
203 152 85 28686 0.30 
193 140 692 7172 9.65 
205 158 288 7930 3.63 
149 84 210 6540 3.21 
 
 Table 6 contains a comparison of the service records flagged as fraudulent using the ICD-
9 regression models versus the ICD-10 regression models.  For each CCS combination, the ICD-
10 regression models, which lacked the diagnosis and procedure covariates, identified less 
service records as being fraudulent.  CCS groups containing a higher number of distinct 
diagnosis and procedure codes had a more significant discrepancy in the services flagged, while 
the CCS group 203/152, which contained only 5 distinct diagnosis codes and 1 distinct procedure 
code, had little discrepancy. 
 
Table : Comparison of Fraud Results 
CCS 
Diagnosis 
CCS 
Procedure 
ICD-9 Fraud 
Only 
ICD-10 Fraud 
Only 
Both Fraud Neither 
Fraud 
203 152 3 2 83 28598 
193 140 131 52 640 6349 
205 158 295 130 158 7347 
149 84 218 54 156 6112 
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9 Conclusions 
 The preliminary results from our experiment indicate that the unavailability of diagnosis 
and procedure codes as metrics for a supervised and predictive fraud detection system such as a 
logistic regression model does have an effect on the identification of fraudulent and non-
fraudulent inpatient healthcare claims.  If a supervised learning method is not trained using 
labeled ICD-10 data, the predictive power of the diagnosis and procedure codes goes to waste.  
Even with the presence of a clinical grouper that was compatible for both ICD-9 and ICD-10 
codes, the performance of the fraud detection system we implemented still suffered when these 
two covariates were eliminated.   
 
 As the ICD-10 implementation date continues to approach, fraud detection systems that 
only utilize a small number of metrics or were trained using only ICD-9 data are potentially at 
risk to experience this transitional impact.  However, agencies and companies that have properly 
prepared their fraud detection systems for this deadline will be able to enjoy the specificity and 
the predictive power ICD-10 codes provide. 
 
10 Limitations and Future Work 
  
The nature of the data that we used caused various limitations within the project.  A lack 
of known instances of fraud and abuse within the dataset was the most glaring issue with the 
APCD data.  Most research groups exploring the field of healthcare fraud detection work in 
conjunction with a health insurance company or agency, and this governmental or private entity 
typically has access to fraudulent claims data.  Developing our own fraud detection system 
without labeled training data proved to be quite challenging, since we were unable to verify our 
models in any way. 
  
 Healthcare data that is available to the public has a significant amount of information 
redacted or concealed, due to privacy concerns.  Researchers have reported a large number of 
data attributes as valuable features for any fraud detection method, but many of these predictive 
attributes were not included in the APCD data.  Therefore, we were forced to use the basic set of 
DRG classifiers as the covariates for logistic regression. 
 
 Public use data maintained by organizations such as the APCD, the Research Data 
Assistance Center (ResDAC), the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), and the 
Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project (HCUP) better serves research involving healthcare 
costs, quantity and quality of treatment, morbidity and mortality patterns, and hospital utilization.  
The sensitive nature of healthcare fraud stemming from legality issues causes any known 
fraudulent instances to be withheld from publically available claims data.  Therefore, within our 
system, we were flagging claims based on abnormality, rather than abusiveness.  This type of 
healthcare data is quite valuable in a variety of research fields, but its usefulness is limited in the 
detection and prevention of healthcare fraud. 
 
 The system used to store the data and run the experiment was also limiting.  Storing, 
accessing, and manipulating 141 GB worth of data in a local SQL Server database on a desktop 
computer was less than optimal.  The original set of 184 million healthcare service records from 
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2005 through 2014 had to be reduced down to the 43 million records from 2012 and 2013.  Of 
those 43 million records, approximately 9% were inpatient claims, but R was still unable to 
consistently handle accessing 3.87 million claims from a database.  We ultimately had to settle 
on using a small subset of inpatient claims from 2012 and 2013 for our experiment.   
 
 The natural next step of this project would be to test this idea of a transitional impact 
using fraud detection systems currently being implemented within the industry.  Large health 
insurance companies and governmental agencies have likely been preparing for this transition to 
ICD-10 for years, and the necessary adjustments to their fraud detection algorithms and systems 
have been made.  Smaller healthcare insurance entities that rely on simplistic or outdated 
methods, however, could experience issues regarding the accurate detection of fraud.  Testing the 
capabilities of these smaller or older systems using ICD-10 claims could reveal deficiencies that 
need to be addressed before the transition to ICD-10 occurs. 
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11 Appendices 
 
11.1 Sample of Claims Data Format 
 
COVERAGE_CLASS FROM_YEAR ADM_YR DIS_YR CLAIM_ID_KEY … 
Field Position 1 Field Position 
2 
Field 
Position 3 
Field 
Position 4 
Field Position 5 …. 
VARCHAR(3) VARCHAR(4) INT(4) INT(4) NUMERIC(12) … 
 
Coverage Class (COVERAGE_CLASS): This field indicated the type of record.  For all medical 
claims records, this value will be MED.  Pharmacy Claims are PHM.  Dental Claims are DEN. 
 
Date of Service (From) Year (FROM_YEAR): This field contains the date of service of medical 
claims in a CCYY format.  Its source is the Date of Service from element (MC059) in the 
medical claims. 
 
Admission Year (ADM_YR): This field contains the year of the inpatient admission in CCYY 
format; Its source is the Admission Date element (MC018) in the medical claims file.  These are 
only populated when valid codes include: 
 0….Not an inpatient record 
 -1…Not specified (No discharge date reported) 
 -2…Not valid (Invalid discharge date code reported) 
 
Discharge Year (DIS_YR): This field contains the year of the inpatient discharge from the 
hospital in CCYY format; Its source is the Discharge Date element (MC069) in the medical 
claims file.  In addition to dates in CCYY format, valid codes also include: 
 0….Not an inpatient record 
 -1…Not specified (No discharge date reported) 
 -2…Not valid (Invalid discharge date code reported) 
 
Claim Key (CLAIM_ID_KEY): Unique identifier for the claim within the data warehouse. 
 
(This is just a sample of the first five elements of the data.  This table continues to include the 
other 58 remaining attributes.) 
 
 
11.2 Data Auditing Queries 
(Note: The same queries were used for both 2012 and 2013 data subsets.) 
 
UPDATE CLAIM_2013 
SET MY_KEY = CAST(CONCAT(SUBSTRING(IMPUTED_SERVICE_KEY,1,4), '.', 
SUBSTRING(IMPUTED_SERVICE_KEY,6,10)) AS FLOAT); 
 
DELETE FROM CLAIM_2013 
WHERE AMT_BILLED <= 0.00 OR QTY <= 0; 
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11.3 Clinical Classification Queries 
(Note: The same queries were used for both 2012 and 2013 data subsets.) 
 
UPDATE CLAIM_2013 
SET CCS_DX = ccs.CCS 
FROM CLAIM_2013 cl INNER JOIN REF_ICD9DX_CCSXW ccs 
ON cl.ICD_DIAG_01_PRIMARY = ccs.ICD9_DX 
WHERE cl.ICD_DIAG_01_PRIMARY != '' 
 AND CCS_DX IS NULL; 
 
UPDATE CLAIM_2013 
SET ccs_dx = 'NO_ICD' 
WHERE ICD_DIAG_01_PRIMARY = '' 
 AND CCS_DX IS NULL; 
 
UPDATE CLAIM_2013 
SET ccs_dx = 'INVALID' 
WHERE ccs_dx IS NULL; 
 
UPDATE CLAIM_2013 
SET CCS_PROC = ccs.CCS 
FROM CLAIM_2013 cl INNER JOIN REF_ICD9P_CCSXW ccs 
ON cl.ICD_PROC_01_PRI = ccs.ICD9_PROC 
WHERE cl.ICD_PROC_01_PRI != '' 
 AND CCS_PROC IS NULL; 
 
UPDATE CLAIM_2013 
SET ccs_proc = 'NO_ICD' 
WHERE ICD_PROC_01_PRI = '' 
 AND CCS_PROC IS NULL; 
 
UPDATE CLAIM_2013 
SET ccs_proc = 'INVALID' 
WHERE ccs_proc IS NULL; 
UPDATE CLAIM_2013 
SET CCS_CPT = cpt.CCS 
FROM CLAIM_2013 cl INNER JOIN REF_CPT_CCSXW cpt 
ON cl.proc_code = cpt.cpt 
WHERE cl.proc_code != '' 
 AND CCS_CPT IS NULL; 
 
UPDATE CLAIM_2013 
SET ccs_cpt = 'NO_CPT' 
WHERE proc_code = '' 
 AND CCS_CPT IS NULL; 
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UPDATE CLAIM_2013 
SET ccs_cpt = 'INVALID' 
WHERE ccs_cpt IS NULL; 
 
UPDATE CLAIM_2013 
SET CCS_FLAG = 'IGNORE' 
WHERE ccs_cpt != 'NO_CPT' 
 AND ccs_cpt != 'INVALID' 
 AND ccs_proc != 'NO_ICD' 
 AND ccs_proc != 'INVALID'; 
 
UPDATE CLAIM_2013 
SET CCS_FLAG = 'CPT' 
WHERE ccs_cpt != 'NO_CPT' 
 AND ccs_cpt != 'INVALID' 
 AND CCS_FLAG IS NULL; 
 
UPDATE CLAIM_2013 
SET CCS_FLAG = 'PROC' 
WHERE ccs_proc != 'NO_ICD' 
 AND ccs_proc != 'INVALID' 
 AND CCS_FLAG IS NULL; 
 
UPDATE CLAIM_2013 
SET CCS_FLAG = 'NO_CCS' 
WHERE CCS_FLAG IS NULL; 
 
SELECT TOP (10) COUNT(services_key), CCS_DX, CCS_CPT 
FROM CLAIM_2012 
WHERE CCS_FLAG = 'CPT' 
GROUP BY CCS_DX, CCS_CPT 
ORDER BY COUNT(services_key) DESC; 
 
 
SELECT TOP (10) COUNT(services_key), CCS_DX, CCS_PROC 
FROM CLAIM_2012 
WHERE CCS_FLAG = 'PROC' 
GROUP BY CCS_DX, CCS_PROC 
ORDER BY COUNT(services_key) DESC; 
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11.4 Distributions of Selected CCS Combinations 
 
 
 
 
34	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11.5 Outlier Detection Plots 
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11.6 Outlier Detection Queries and R Code 
 (Note: The same queries and code were used for all four CCS groups.) 
 
SELECT Claim.CCS_DX, Claim.CCS_PROC, Claim.CLAIM_ID_KEY, 
Claim.SERVICES_KEY, Claim.ICD_DIAG_01_PRIMARY, Claim.ICD_PROC_01_PRI, 
Claim.REV_CODE, Claim.AMT_BILLED, Claim.QTY, Amount.TOTAL, Claim.DIS_STAT, 
Claim.AGE, Claim.SEX, Claim.MY_KEY, RowCalc.ROW_NUM 
FROM CLAIM_2012 AS Claim, (SELECT CLAIM_ID_KEY, 
ROUND(SUM(AMT_BILLED/QTY),2) AS TOTAL FROM CLAIM_2012 WHERE CCS_DX 
= '203' AND CCS_PROC = '152' AND CCS_FLAG = 'PROC' AND AMT_BILLED > 0 AND 
QTY > 0 GROUP BY CLAIM_ID_KEY) AS Amount, 
(SELECT CLAIM_ID_KEY, ROW_NUMBER () OVER (ORDER BY MY_KEY ASC) AS 
ROW_NUM FROM CLAIM_2012 WHERE CCS_DX = '203' AND CCS_PROC = '152' AND 
CCS_FLAG = 'PROC' AND AMT_BILLED > 0 AND QTY > 0 GROUP BY CLAIM_ID_KEY, 
MY_KEY) AS RowCalc 
WHERE CCS_DX = '203' AND CCS_PROC = '152' AND CCS_FLAG = 'PROC' AND 
AMT_BILLED > 0 AND QTY > 0 AND Claim.CLAIM_ID_KEY = Amount.CLAIM_ID_KEY 
AND Claim.CLAIM_ID_KEY = RowCalc.CLAIM_ID_KEY 
ORDER BY ROW_NUM; 
 
SELECT TOTAL 
FROM TRAINING 
WHERE CCS_DX = '203' AND CCS_PROC = '152' 
GROUP BY ROW_NUM, TOTAL 
ORDER BY ROW_NUM ASC; 
 
con <- odbcConnect("HealthcareData") 
query1 <- paste0("SELECT TOTAL 
FROM TRAINING 
WHERE CCS_DX = '203' AND CCS_PROC = '152' 
GROUP BY ROW_NUM, TOTAL 
ORDER BY ROW_NUM ASC;") 
Results1 <- sqlQuery(con, query1) 
Fraud1 <- AnomalyDetectionVec(Results1,  
                                max_anoms = 0.05,  
                                 direction = "pos",  
                                 alpha = 0.05,  
                                 period = 131,  
                                 plot = T,  
                                 y_log = T,  
                                 xlabel = "",  
                                 ylabel = "") 
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Fraud1 
 
for (row in 1:nrow(Fraud1$anoms)) { 
     query <- paste0( 
"Update TRAINING 
SET TRAINING.FRAUD = 1 
WHERE TRAINING.CCS_DX = '203' AND TRAINING.CCS_PROC = '152' AND 
TRAINING.ROW_NUM = ", Fraud1$anoms$index[row], ";" 
) 
sqlQuery(con, query) 
} 
 
Update TRAINING 
SET TRAINING.FRAUD = 0 
WHERE TRAINING.FRAUD IS NULL; 
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11.7 Logistic Regression R Code 
 (Note: The same code was used for all four CCS groups.) 
 
query11 <- paste0("SELECT ICD_DIAG_01_PRIMARY AS DIAGNOSIS, 
ICD_PROC_01_PRI AS 'PROCEDURE', AMT_BILLED AS COST, QTY AS QUANTITY, 
(AMT_BILLED/QTY) AS SUBTOTAL, DIS_STAT AS 'STATUS', AGE, SEX, FRAUD 
FROM TRAINING 
WHERE CCS_DX = '203' AND CCS_PROC = ‘152';") 
Results11 <- sqlQuery(con, query11) 
 
Logit11 <- glm(FRAUD ~ DIAGNOSIS + PROCEDURE + COST + QUANTITY + 
SUBTOTAL + STATUS + AGE + SEX, data = Results1, family = "binomial") 
 
query21 <- paste0("SELECT AMT_BILLED AS COST, QTY AS QUANTITY, 
(AMT_BILLED/QTY) AS SUBTOTAL, DIS_STAT AS 'STATUS', AGE, SEX, FRAUD 
FROM TRAINING 
WHERE CCS_DX = '203' AND CCS_PROC = ‘152';") 
 
Results21 <- sqlQuery(con, query21) 
 
Logit21 <- glm(FRAUD ~ COST + QUANTITY + SUBTOTAL + STATUS + AGE + SEX, 
data = Results21, family = "binomial") 
 
query12 <- paste0("SELECT SERVICES_KEY, ICD_DIAG_01_PRIMARY AS DIAGNOSIS, 
ICD_PROC_01_PRI AS 'PROCEDURE', AMT_BILLED AS COST, QTY AS QUANTITY, 
(AMT_BILLED/QTY) AS SUBTOTAL, DIS_STAT AS 'STATUS', AGE, SEX 
FROM TESTING 
WHERE CCS_DX = '203';") 
 
Predict12 <- sqlQuery(con, query12) 
 
Predict12$fraudICD9 <- predict(Logit11, newdata = Predict12, type = "response") 
 
query22 <- paste0("SELECT SERVICES_KEY, AMT_BILLED AS COST, QTY AS 
QUANTITY, (AMT_BILLED/QTY) AS SUBTOTAL, DIS_STAT AS 'STATUS', AGE, SEX 
FROM TESTING 
WHERE CCS_DX = '203';") 
 
Predict22 <- sqlQuery(con, query22) 
 
Predict22$fraudICD10 <- predict(Logit21, newdata = Predict22, type = "response") 
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11.8 Logistic Regression Models 
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